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From “Patani Melayu” 
to “Thai Muslim”
It  would  appear  a  simple  question: 
who  are  the  people  at  the  centre  of 
the  conflict  in  Thailand’s  southern 
border  provinces?  The  Thai  and  Ma-
laysian governments, the media, many 
academics, and the general public who 
have contributed to the mountains of 
words  produced  about  the  violence 
that has taken place over the last two 
years,  seem  to  agree:  “Muslims.”  The 
Thai Government will often add an ad-
jective to this collective name to affirm 
this group’s nationality, “Thai Muslims.” 
Thus merely through the use of these religious labels to represent the 
actors involved in the conflict, it is difficult for many people to imag-
ine it to be otherwise. The result is a depressing one. On Thai Internet 
web-boards—a useful source for gauging uncensored public opinion 
nowadays—one can read quite virulent anti-Muslim attacks. 
Yet if the conflict were essentially religious then hundreds of thou-
sands  of “Muslims”  all  over  Thailand  outside  the  border  provinces 
would surely rise up in mass revolt against the Thai state in a gesture 
of solidarity with their co-religionists. But they do not. If not, why then 
is this conflict consistently talked about today using religious terminol-
ogy? The answer can be found in the suppression 
of official references to the distinct ethnic Malay 
identity of the population of the border provinc-
es, in favour of the generic term, “Thai Muslims.” 
The  consequence  of  this  re-labelling  has  been 
that the essence of the conflict, a clash between 
competing Thai  and  Patani  Malay  nationalisms, 
has been lost amidst explanations of the conflict 
in religious terms. 
From “Malays” to “Thai Muslims”
Historically,  both  in  the  discourse  of  the Thai 
state as well as that of its adversaries in the South, 
the people of the former Patani sultanate were 
usually referred to as melayu (Malay). Even during 
the reign of the modernizing king Chulalongkorn, 
who oversaw the abolition of the Patani sultan-
ate and the definitive absorption of the territories 
of the former sultanate into the Thai state under 
the 1909 Anglo-Siamese Treaty, the Thai court ha-
bitually and un-selfconsciously referred to the re-
gion’s inhabitants as Malay. The King once stated 
that he hoped to eventually achieve a situation where “even though 
they are Malays and of a different faith … [they] are Thais in sentiment 
and outlook just as any other Thai …” Thus it seemed possible then, still 
under the Absolute Monarchy, for the Thai government to recognize 
dual ethnic identities within one state, “Thai” and “Malay.”
Likewise, the Thai state’s antagonists in the south following the Sec-
ond World War also spoke of and for the “Malays.” Ibrahim Syukri, au-
thor of a popular nationalist history of Patani published in 1948 titled 
Sejarah Kerajaan Melayu Patani (History of the Malay Kingdom of Patani) 
called for the recognition of the “nationality [of the population of Pa-
tani] as a “Malay people.” Following the end of the Second World War, 
as Malay nationalism was gathering momentum across the border and 
Thailand was forced by the British to give up its irredentist annexa-
tions during the war, including the northern Malayan states, a group 
of Malay leaders in the Patani region submitted a petition to the British 
requesting the British Government to “have the kindness to release our 
country and ourselves from the pressure of Siam.” Patani, they pointed 
out, “is really a Malay country, formerly 
ruled by Malay Rajas for generations.” 
Moreover, the political ideology of the 
most prominent of the region’s separa-
tist organizations that sprung up soon 
after has been the national liberation 
of the “Patani Malays.”
Until recently then, the majority pop-
ulation  of  this  region  was  commonly 
referred to in ethnic terms—as Malays. 
It is indeed remarkable how little refer-
ence there was to their religious iden-
tity. How then, have the subjects of the 
conflict been transformed from “Malays” into “Muslims”? 
First, since the era of de-colonization and the rise of Malay national-
ism in British Malaya, the Thai government has actively sought to avoid 
references to the Malay ethnic identity of the subjects of the region. 
It feared that with the new, post-colonial logic of nation-based states, 
recognition of the people of the region as “Malay” might give credibility 
to demands for a separate Malay state, either based on the territories of 
the old Malay sultanate of Patani, or through union with the other Malay 
states of British Malaya, which were now preparing for independence 
from Britain. Under the assimilationist policies of national integration, 
which began in Thailand from the beginning of the Second World War 
and held sway through to the 1990s, Malay ethnic identity as expressed 
in terms of language, dress, education, history, and custom has been 
consistently discouraged by the state. The government has attempted 
to replace it with a religious label, “Thai Muslims” or “Thai Islam” in the 
hope that this linguistic change would contribute to the overall goal of 
assimilation. Thus for Thai governments since the Second World War, 
the only possible identity officially acceptable for the “Patani Malays” 
within the Thai nation-state was as “Thai Muslims.”
Islamization in Malaysia 
Another  contributing  factor  has  been  the  politicization  of  Islam 
amongst the Malays in neighbouring Malaysia. Although this process 
first became clearly visible in the 1970s, its seeds were sown with the 
establishment of the state of Malaysia and the legal definition of Malay-
ness. One of the components of Malay identity as defined by the Ma-
laysian Constitution was “a person who professes the religion of Islam.” 
Following Malaysia’s independence in 1957, therefore, to be a Malay—
and thereby eligible to the special privileges accorded to “Malays”—le-
gally one must be a Muslim. Yet up until the 1970s Islam was marginal 
to most discussions of Malay identity. Reading Mahathir’s controversial 
book, The Malay Dilemma, first published in 1970, one year after bloody 
race riots, it is striking that Islam receives hardly any attention. The bulk 
of the book concentrates on Malay cultural traits that were supposedly 
responsible for the “dilemma” in which, according to Mahathir, the Ma-
lays now found themselves—that is, a majority in an ethnically plural 
country and politically dominant, but seemingly unwilling to use that 
dominance to improve their disadvantaged social and economic posi-
tion because of a cultural predisposition for tolerance. 
Ironically  it  was  Mahathir  who,  upon  becoming  Prime  Minister  in 
1981,  began  to  implement  a  policy  of  Islamization.  A  year  later  he 
co-opted the former Muslim student activist Anwar Ibrahim into the 
government. Between them a policy emerged which viewed Islam as 
the answer to “social ills”—corruption, laziness, materialism, drug ad-
diction, promiscuity, incest, child abuse—which appeared to be more 
prevalent among the Malays than the other ethnic groups, and which 
were blamed on the government’s policy rapid economic development. 
It is from this era the government began to promote Islam as a solution 
to these problems and to extol Malays to follow more closely the teach-
A violent insurgency in the ethnically Malay 
Muslim region of southern Thailand has 
claimed over a thousand lives since 2004. 
Although the conflict between the country’s 
southernmost provinces and the Thai state 
dates back at least a century, recently the 
ideology in which the conflict is expressed has 
changed markedly. Whereas a generation ago 
the goal was “liberation” of the ethnically Malay 
population from the former sultanate of Patani, 
today the spirit of the movement is expressed 
predominantly in Islamic terms. 
With the spectre 
of communism 
finally put to rest 
as an ideology 
of resistance … 
radical Islam has 
taken its place.
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ings of Islam. Islamic discourse in Ma-
laysia,  therefore,  became  dominated 
by the government, and the two key 
figures in the Islamization of Malay so-
ciety were the Western-educated Ma-
hathir and Anwar, rather than trained 
Islamic scholars. Thus when Patani Ma-
lays look today to their Malay brothers 
in Malaysia they see a more Islamized 
Malay identity.
A third factor behind the represen-
tation  of  the  conflict  in  the  south  in 
religious terms has of course been the 
so-called global “Islamic revival” since 
the 1970s, and particularly the way in 
which Islam has become an ideology of 
resistance. Its prestige grew even fur-
ther with the end of the Cold War, the 
collapse of the Soviet Union and with it 
international communism, which dealt 
a deathblow to most Marxist-inspired 
resistance movements in the develop-
ing  world. The  extraordinary  political 
and economic consensus we live under 
today  that  Fukuyama  termed  with  a 
troubling sense of finality, “the end of 
history,” that is, liberal democracy and 
free market capitalism, means there is no longer a credible leftist pro-
gramme of resistance available to groups for whom the existing status 
quo is unbearable. With the spectre of communism finally put to rest 
as an ideology of resistance, for certain groups of Muslims radical Islam 
has taken its place.
Despite the fact that some Patani Malays are known to have fought 
in Afghanistan, that some have been trained overseas in “jihadist” gue-
rilla warfare, and that people in the region have links with “Islamist” 
movements elsewhere in the world, almost every serious study of the 
conflict shows that the grievances that have given rise to the conflict 
are entirely local. The fact that Islam plays a much more prominent role 
in the rhetoric of the people of the region is certainly partly related 
to the global Islamic revival that has also influenced the Muslims of 
the southern Thai border provinces. But it is even more related to the 
critical problem of needing to find an effective ideology of resistance in 
the, post-Cold War, globalized environment, to help provide meaning 
and perhaps also a resolution to one of the region’s most intractable 
conflicts. 
“De-culturalization” of Islam in Southern Thailand?
Amidst this Islamic discourse we might well ask, to what extent does 
a Patani Malay ethnic identity still exist among the local population of 
Thailand’s southern border provinces? Anecdotally it is said that flu-
ency in the distinctive Patani Malay dialect among the young has de-
creased compared to a generation ago, and that competence in Thai 
has increased. A half-century of assimilationist policies has certainly 
had some effect. Many people from the region travel to Malaysia and 
some to Indonesia for educational and employment, which exposes 
them to an alternative “Malay” cultural milieu. Another cultural influ-
ence in the region that has increased is Arabic, as students return from 
their studies in the Middle East, or as a result of funding provided by 
Arab states for religious and educational purposes.
Numerous  studies  point  to  social  problems  prevalent  among  the 
youth in the region, including drug addiction, and involvement in vio-
lence and petty crime. One wonders whether one of the sources of the 
violence might be an identity crisis among young men of the region 
resulting from the obliteration of Patani Malay identity over the last 
century, the resistance to the full adoption of a Thai identity given its 
association with discrimination and oppression, and the attraction of a 
radicalized Islam to fill the void. According to Olivier Roy,1 one of the 
reasons for the turn to extremism among some young European Mus-
lims is their rejection of the traditional culture of their parents, their 
inability to find acceptance in the mainstream cultures of Europe, and 
their refuge in a purified, reconstruction of an “imagined” Islam: “Islam-
ic radicalization is a consequence of ‘de-culturalization’ and not the ex-
pression of a pristine culture.” Roy’s argument thus raises the question 
whether a similar phenomenon of de-culturalization, albeit caused by 
different factors, may be partly responsible for the radicalism in Thai-
land’s south. His characterization of radical European Muslims could be 
equally applied to the militants of Thailand’s south: “The generation 
gap, coupled with a sense of disenfranchising […] individualization of 
faith, self-teaching, generation gap, rejection of authority (including 
that of religious established leaders), loosening of family ties, lack of 
socialization with a broader community (including the ethnic commu-
nity of their parents), and withdrawal towards a small inward-looking 
group akin to a cult: all these factors show the extent of the process of 
deculturation of the radicals.”2
If a Patani Malay identity is indeed in crisis, then that may also ex-
plain why the separatist organizations such as Patani United Libera-
tion Organization, the Barisan Revolusi Nasional, and Bersatu, whose 
political ideologies were originally based, as argued above, on national 
liberation tinged with socialism rather than Islam, seem only tangen-
tially involved in the conflict that has erupted since the beginning of 
2004. Despite repeated claims by the government, it is quite unclear to 
what extent, if at all, separatism is a goal of the militants. Indeed, one of 
the most extraordinary aspects of the whole conflict is the ambiguity 
regarding the objectives of the militants, which is perhaps a symptom 
of the confused ideology of the movement in the midst of the void left 
by the obliteration of Patani Malay identity.
Thai national identity thus stands out from that of many of its South-
east Asian neighbours. Whereas Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, even 
Myanmar, have accepted the existence (at least conceptually, if not 
in  practice)  of  dual  identities,  national  and  ethnic,  since  independ-
ence, Thailand maintains an essentially assimilationist model of na-
tional integration. It is revealing that one of the responses to the crisis 
in the south was to renew official nationalist campaigns to promote 
“Thainess.” In the words of one of the most popular nationalist propa-
ganda songs: “underneath the Thai flag the whole population is Thai.” 
And within official discourses of Thainess while there is a place for Mus-
lims, it appears there is no place for Malays.
Patrick Jory is Coordinator of the Southeast Asian Studies Programme, Walailak University, 
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